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Smart Growth,
State Policy and
Public Process
in Maine:
The Dunstan Crossing
Experience
by Sylvia Most
Samuel B. Merrill
Jack D. Kartez
Sprawling development in Maine’s growth areas continues
in spite of the state’s emphasis on comprehensive planning
over the past 20 years. In this article, the authors present
some lessons to be learned from Scarborough’s Dunstan
Crossing project, a planned development which would have
incorporated many of the goals of the national “smart
growth” movement. The project was approved by the elected
town council (one of whom is co-author Sylvia Most), 
and it was in compliance with Scarborough’s town compre-
hensive plan. Nonetheless, the project for now has effectively
been blocked after a lengthy period, described here, that 
saw a citizen referendum, lawsuits, mediation, and many
kinds of public participation. Based on the Dunstan
Crossing experience, the authors make recommendations
regarding the state’s Growth Management Act, about 
more effective regional planning, and more generally about
how to structure public participation in potentially
contentious projects. 
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Much has been written about the impacts ofsprawling development patterns in Maine—on
communities and on the costs of services on the state
and local levels (O’Hara 1997; NE/EFC 2003). In
suburban areas these costs include increased traffic, loss
of community character, new infrastructure require-
ments and loss of open space; in urban areas, they
include excess infrastructure, loss of in-town retail and
commercial businesses and other urban disinvestment.
Some communities in Maine are attempting to avoid
sprawl and to find the kind of development patterns
that many people see as beneficial and, in fact, quite
traditional to New England, but about which actual
agreement and consent has been difficult. Much can 
be learned from each experience. One such case is the
Dunstan Crossing “smart growth” project proposed to
be built in Scarborough (but still in contention after a
citizen referendum, lawsuits, mediated negotiation and
many types of public participation). While comprehen-
sive solutions cannot be based on one case, the saga 
of Dunstan Crossing offers provocative lessons both
about challenges specific to the issues of land use and
sprawl and more generally about the need for delibera-
tive opportunities among citizens and government 
in local and regional issues. In the context of the
Dunstan Crossing project, we make recommendations
in three categories: revising the state’s Growth
Management Act; creating mechanisms to foster effec-
tive regional planning; and carefully structuring public
involvement on projects likely to encounter great
differences of perspective. 
SCARBOROUGH’S DEVELOPMENT BOOM 
AND LONG-RANGE PLANS
To understand the local political situation in whichthis change was being considered, it is illumi-
nating to review growth statistics for the region and
Scarborough. According to the Maine State Planning
Office (2001), while the population of the state
increased 3.8% during the 1990s, the population 
of Cumberland County increased 9.1% and the town 
of Scarborough grew 36%. By 2000, the population
of the town was slightly less than 17,000 residents,
making it the 10th largest community in Maine. This
growth is expected to continue,
despite a local growth cap of
135 housing units per year,
implemented in 2000. 
By 2010, the town of
Scarborough anticipates being
the sixth largest community in
the state, growing 22% to over
20,000 residents, and contin-
uing to outpace the state’s
growth rate of 4.6% (Maine
State Planning Office 2001). 
A community attitude survey
conducted in 1999 listed main-
taining the “small town feeling”
as one of the public’s most
important imperatives for the
future. This sentiment was
repeated in a community
visioning exercise conducted 
in 2002, which clarified that
town residents were not ready
to take their place as a commu-
nity the size of a “city” by
Maine standards. 
The growth in residential
development in Scarborough,
along with corresponding
growth in commercial develop-
ment, resulted in the assessed property valuation of
the town of Scarborough rising 94% between 1993
and 2003, from $1.033 billion to $2.002 billion
(Scarborough 2003). The building cap combined with
regional market forces to become factors in the rise of
average new home prices from $230,000 to $330,000
between 2000 and mid-2003 alone (Risbara 2003).
Rapid growth was evident in the school system, with
new portable classrooms needed at each school in the
district by early 2000. The high school, already among
the largest in the state, graduated 180 students in
2003, but that fall’s incoming freshman class of 260
students forced the community to spend $26.8 million
for a fully locally funded school expansion project, 
the largest ever in the state. The effects of growth also
were felt in pressure on public safety and other public
. . . the saga of
Dunstan Crossing
offers provocative
lessons both about
challenges specific
to the issues of
land use and sprawl
and more generally
about the need 
for deliberative
opportunities
among citizens and
government in local
and regional issues.
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services, which already had added capacity in the late
1990s. The competing needs of increasing town
services and maintaining low yearly tax increases led 
to divisiveness at budgeting time each year.
In 1988, state-level efforts to address the long-
recognized effects of unmanaged growth in Maine
culminated with the establishment of the Growth
Management Act. For growth management to be effec-
tive, it must occur at both the state and the local level.
The state’s Growth Management Act provided grants 
to municipalities for the creation of comprehensive
plans with the goal of designating growth and 
non-growth areas within individual communities.
Scarborough adopted a town comprehensive plan in
1994 in compliance with the act (Scarborough 1994).
The plan outlined many new policy initiatives for
growth management; however, many of the corre-
sponding necessary zoning changes were never codi-
fied. Creation of high-density, “village compact”
districts described in the plan was controversial and
would have had to be paired with equally unpalatable
reductions in allowable zoned housing density in 
the designated rural areas of the town. The “village
compact” resembled a “smart growth” development,
combining proximity of uses with functional open
space to create a pedestrian-scale neighborhood
comfortable for a variety of household types. The
Scarborough Comprehensive Plan recommended 
such a village compact policy in the Dunstan Village
area in Scarborough. By 2000, this idea had never
been implemented in reality, emphasizing that agree-
ment on long-range development policies does not
represent consensus on concrete changes. What to do
about this is a dilemma.
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
After attending a smart growth workshop, two ofthe Portland region’s experienced and local land
developers—brothers John and Elliott Chamberlain—
were motivated to attempt a smart growth-style devel-
opment in Scarborough. Although the Scarborough
comprehensive plan envisioned this type of develop-
ment in the general area chosen, actual development
required discretionary approval of a new “contract
zone” by the Scarborough town council.
Contract zoning is a provision of Scarborough’s
zoning ordinance to be used in situations where a
proposal is made that does not fit the zoning ordinance
and is not suitable for a variance. In these cases, the
town council is authorized to establish whether the
proposal meets criteria defined by ordinance. If the
proposal passes the various stages of the process, it can
be approved as a new zone specifically complying with
terms of the contract established between the private
developer and the town. At the time of the contract
proposal, the majority of the 150 acres controlled by
the developers remained zoned for a low-density, two-
acre minimum lot size, rather than any type of village
compact. Scarborough’s zoning for the land also did
not allow for a mix of residential and commercial 
land uses, and the setback requirements did not allow
for the streetscape design desired by the planners. 
The proposal for Dunstan Crossing was initially named
the “Great American Neighborhood,” a term popular-
ized by the State Planning Office during the 1995-
2002 King administration.1
This contract proposal (ALC Development
Corporation 2002) incorporated many of the goals 
of the smart growth movement well underway nation-
wide, specifically:
1. Development of a previously unsewered set
of parcels encompassing 150 acres.
2. Installation of public sewer and water utilities.
[Scarborough’s comprehensive plan] outlined
many new policy initiatives for growth manage-
ment; however, many of the corresponding
zoning changes were never codified.
SMART GROWTH
3. A mix of uses, including single-family
homes, apartments, condominiums, deed-
restricted units for seniors, and village
commercial storefronts.
4. Pedestrian-oriented streetscapes with homes
close to the road, uninterrupted sidewalks and
slow speed limits.
5. Planned 397 units (reduced from the original
request of 441 units) consisting of a variety
of home designs and lot sizes.
6. Recreational facilities (public ballfield and a
community center).
7. Parking on street during the day. Driveways
located behind houses with access by alleyways
designed for service vehicles and local traffic.
8. Up to 60 acres preserved as open space
within the development, including local parks
and walking trails.
9. One million dollars in a density offset fund to
purchase off-site open space within the “traffic
shed” of the Dunstan Corner intersection.
10. Project contingent upon $1.8 million in
state transportation money to fix the difficult
Dunstan Corner intersections prior to
proceeding with the project beyond the first
few years.
For project proponents, the development design
and public investments promised to address many of
the community’s growth issues. Despite its size, the
configuration of housing units promised to have a
lower per-unit impact on school enrollment than a
development of single-family homes on two-acre lots,
the standard of the prior decade. New neighborhoods
of single-family homes in Scarborough produced 0.92
new enrollments per home on average. If 65 single-
family homes were developed with existing zoning,
this would result in 60 new school enrollments, which
provided the baseline for comparison to the Great
American Neighborhood. To establish the impact of
the project on school enrollment, the town assembled
figures from similar housing types in Scarborough and
in New England. With this information, the developers
calculated the additional enrollments from the proposed
441-unit development to be 90 new school children, 
a dramatically moderate figure compared to the impact
of the standard subdivision. The smaller home sizes,
condominiums, apartments and senior housing led to 
a low expectation for school enrollments. During initial
stages of the project, developers would contribute $1
million to an “offset” fund to be used to purchase
developable land on the roads directly leading to the
Dunstan intersection, to offset the additional school
enrollment impact of the higher density development
and to help mitigate traffic impacts from additional
cars, already a capacity issue in the area. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Maine Department
of Transportation (MDOT) agreed to provide funding
on an accelerated schedule to solve traffic problems at
the Dunstan intersections in recognition of the long-
term benefits of smart growth development in this
growing area. With this assurance, the developers
agreed to language in the contract restricting progress
of the project to coincide with completion of the
traffic improvements. It became significant that the
promised actions by MDOT were never clearly ratified.
In fact, at one point the MDOT representative stated 
in a local public meeting that the traffic improvement
money was not directly tied to the Dunstan Crossing
project. By fall 2002, nearly two years after the pursuit
of project approval began, the community’s leadership
had lined up largely in support of the proposal.
However, residents of the Dunstan neighborhood, 
not having any formal assurance of the MDOT
commitment, were not convinced it was worth the 
risk. Residents were increasingly vocal that the project
was too large, that it would exacerbate an already 
difficult traffic situation, and that it would overwhelm
the community’s already over-burdened schools.
DELIBERATING ON A COMPLEX CHANGE
Problems that are more difficult to resolve andwhich call forth unfamiliar proposed solutions 
are likely to require more resources and/or political
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agreement than those that are more straightforward
with accepted responses (Bryson and Delbecq 1979).
Such problems, from the beginning, demand thorough
consideration of the approach leaders will take. 
In the case of Dunstan Crossing, the offset fund
for open space and traffic improvements were public
benefits that aimed at managing impacts of sprawling
development in other parts of the community. However,
many voters in the area surrounding the project were
new to Scarborough, and living in those very sprawling
developments that the smart growth movement rails
against. It therefore became politically difficult to send 
a message to these residents that their new $350,000
homes were somehow “bad” for Scarborough.
Public discourse on the project spanned more than
two years and incorporated conscious and innovative
steps to anticipate complexity and differences. At the
outset, before submission of an actual project plan, 
the developers organized public design meetings and
utilized an interactive process to elicit ideas from and
gain public support of residents in the Dunstan neigh-
borhood. For example, in March 2001, the developers
sent more than 500 meeting notices to residents of the
Dunstan area to initiate the first major local discussions
of a Great American Neighborhood concept. More
than 50 people turned out to participate in the first
meeting, and as many as 25 continued through the
initial planning process (Chamberlain 2002). By the
time the proposal was presented to the town, it
included a plan demonstrated to have been designed
with the direct input of these neighbors and area resi-
dents, who came to be advocates for incorporating
smart growth ideas into the development.
The resulting Dunstan Crossing project, eventually
reduced from 441 to 397 residential units of several
types, was the largest comprehensive residential project
ever presented to Scarborough. Although the developers
had worked with a core of committed citizen partici-
pants, initial general public opinion on the project in the
town was guarded or negative. While many neighbors
turned out at the outset to contribute to the design and
were engaged as valued collaborators by the developers’
team, many more citizens had not participated. When
the contract zoning process proceeded, members of the
public who were opposed became increasingly vocal.
Some opponents claimed that because initial design
meetings were convened and facilitated by the devel-
opers’ consultants, outcomes were not representative 
of public opinion, but were instead predetermined to
represent the applicant’s interests. 
The contract zoning process was conducted by the
town council with project review and advice from the
planning board and entailed numerous public hearings.
However, it was clear that this form of public engage-
ment, with its inherent formality and strategic nature 
as a prelude to “up or down” decisions, had become
increasingly frustrating for the public. In response, the
town council held a public forum at a church in the
Dunstan neighborhood in late winter 2003. While a
dialogue between residents and the council finally
occurred, councilors were defensive in the face of
an audience predominantly hostile to the project. 
Perhaps because of economic uncertainty and the
prospect of rising taxes, citizens were reluctant to trust
public officials’ analysis of the projected impacts of
Dunstan Crossing. While staff analysis indicated that
school and public service impacts would be completely
offset by the tax revenues from the increased valuation,
most residents remained unconvinced. Additionally,
there was little public belief that the traffic congestion
in the area could be resolved. Although the project was
anticipated to “build out” at a modest pace over the
course of 10-15 years, due in part to Scarborough’s
annual building permit cap, public outcry appeared to
discount the long time horizon and assume all impacts
would be felt immediately. Over time, positive environ-
mental impacts of the project lost public recognition in
the face of perceived infrastructure and fiscal impacts. 
The state, the town, and the developers were
unable to obtain an ally in, or a positive endorsement
from, the media, which may have contributed to the
project’s political failure. The project was routinely
derided in the well-read local weekly newspapers. The
predominantly negative headlines and editorials cited
issues of the project’s size, its impact on traffic, and 
the lack of public support. In fall 2002, this negative
public opinion crystallized with presentation by an
opposition group of a petition against the project with
over 1,000 signatures. The town council accepted the
petition and scheduled a neighborhood meeting, yet
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did not halt the contract zoning process, a decision
which in hindsight appears to have been a critical 
juncture and perhaps a lost opportunity.
The town council’s insistence on focusing on
specific concerns of the public, rather than the over-
whelming message of general dissatisfaction, was not
ill-intended. The elected officials felt the project was 
in the best interests of the community, based on a
reasoned analysis of available data and policies in the
town’s comprehensive plan (which, after all, called for
such new development patterns for the Dunstan area).
The public was viewed as becoming increasingly
unreasonable, and communication and opportunities
for beneficial agreement broke down with neither
skeptical public nor citizen officials elected by them
able to act on or even recognize value in the other
side’s concerns. 
In the Dunstan Crossing contract zoning process,
the two parties were the town council and the appli-
cant; the public was only party to the contract through
its elected officials. Elected officials were unwilling
(and, perhaps, unable by virtue of there being no suit-
able process) to open up the contract negotiations to
the public to allow major reformulations of interests,
solutions and performance guarantees about project
details. Indeed, this would have been a ceding of
authority not really permitted by the process. Because
elected officials felt they were serving the public will
by implementing an aspect of the comprehensive 
plan, there was little attempt to stop the process and
incorporate new information in the form of new public
opinion about the fundamental issues of how to grow. 
DIFFICULT LESSONS ABOUT 
LOCAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
There is an important lesson embedded here forMaine communities, one that has received growing
attention elsewhere as communities founder before
landing stable agreements about how to grow. Despite a
community’s best intentions, as argued four decades ago
by Alan Altshuler in his classic critique of city planning,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to get genuine public
debate on a comprehensive plan. It is fair to say that the
public is ill-prepared to debate the abstract notion of a
“plan” (Innes 1996). Until the plan is implemented and
the public can observe the impacts or perceived impacts
of a proposal, it is incomprehensible. In Scarborough,
regardless of whether the zoning ordinance was
updated to be consistent with the plan (as Oregon and
only a few other states’ legal doctrines require more
faithfully), the town council began deliberations with
the assumption that the 1994 comprehensive plan—a
fundamental town policy document—remained valid
and accepted by the community. 
Against this assumption, the town council never
really debated whether smart growth was good for
Scarborough, or even more importantly, what the
balance or distribution of solutions to satisfy varied
community interests should be. When opposition
mounted, councilors focused on specific concerns being
raised—traffic, school enrollment, crime, and health.
There was a general unwillingness among councilors
who endorsed the plan to consider the complaint that
it was “just too big,” a fundamental question that would
have required a renegotiation of basic policy commit-
ments in the plan. Opposed citizens greeted every
attempt by both town and developers to discuss solu-
tions to specific problems with the charge, “You’re just
not listening to us.” Complicating matters, by the time
the project’s opposition was organized, the developers
had invested a significant amount of time and money
in the project. The political fray and resulting uncer-
tainty became a business risk that few developers
would be able to endure. For the town, the cumulative
impact of these issues was that addressing any party’s
concerns individually seemed counterproductive. In
fact, much advice from the public policy alternative
The elected officials felt the project was in 
the best interests of the community, based 
on a reasoned analysis of available data and
policies in the town’s comprehensive plan… .
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dispute resolution (ADR) field suggests that one-issue-
at-a-time decisions can frustrate the need to package
possible multi-issue solutions. This situation was indeed
experienced in Scarborough.
Effective negotiation of differences (as an alterna-
tive to the planning dilemma) also suggests that consent
grows from processes of collective criticism, not from
silence or a strategic party line (Innes 1996; Forester
1980). Yet once positions were established (in this 
case as with many others), criticism tended to polarize
rather than bring the parties toward consensus—
another dilemma. Significantly, there was no mecha-
nism to resolve differences between leadership and
public opinion once this stylized positioning encour-
aged by the process took hold.
The public process involved with contract zoning
is somewhat to blame for this failing, as is the formal
procedure—the public hearing—more generally. 
The goal of consensus building is deliberation that 
is informed, takes into account the interests of all,
including the weakest, and uses only “good reasons,”
such as protecting each others’ interests, and promoting
what is good for the community (Susskind and
Cruikshank 1987; Innes 1996). Steps in Scarborough’s
contract zoning process are intended to meet these
needs. However, the process cedes all power in deliber-
ation to the town council and to the applicant—it is a
negotiated contract that ultimately becomes ordinance,
but the table is too limited. The public’s only avenue
for involvement comes in the public hearing, a one-way
mechanism, not a deliberative one, and thus a design
for trouble. To get the attention of councilors when
this forum failed to do so, citizens attempted a petition
drive and attended the public forum held outside of
council chambers. The town council had no formal
mechanism to incorporate this input (the petition was
not “official” by legal standards); therefore, the input
appeared to be largely discounted. 
The result? After the town council and the devel-
opers reached an agreement and signed a contract early
in summer 2003, a legal petition drive was mounted 
to force a local referendum vote to rescind the zoning
action. The drive was successful, resulting in a record
local election turnout in July 2003, which ultimately
rejected the project by a 4:1 margin, overruling the
town council’s decision. 
Subsequent events, still unfolding at the time of
this writing, include a lawsuit by the developers against
the town of Scarborough, citing a failure to follow 
the state’s Growth Management Act by implementing
village compact zoning in the Dunstan area consistent
with the comprehensive plan. A court-encouraged, 60-
day mediated negotiation was held soon after the filing
of the suit in late 2003, between the town, developer-
plaintiffs, and representatives of the citizen petition-
referendum drive. This produced an agreement on a
smaller 200-unit compromise project, which retained
many of the original design features, including a mix
of housing, walkability, a reduced offset fund and
public trails. But the resulting consent decree failed in
large part because MDOT pulled the funding for the
intersection improvements when the project’s size no
longer seemed to qualify as “smart growth.” Without
traffic improvements, councilors required any new
contract zoning agreement to go to the voters for
approval, a deal-killer for the developers.
It is not hard to point to possible reasons (well
known in the public alternative dispute resolution
field) why the mediation produced disappointing
results. These include the failure to coordinate
proposed settlements with key regulators like MDOT;
using “red flag procedures”; and the lack of implemen-
tation provisions and call-back opportunities (Kartez
and Bowman 1993). But the fundamental source of
failure is that these supplements to the conventional
process simply came too late. Like alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), successful public policy formulation
requires that differences be confronted at the earliest
The community clearly did not share 
a common vision for the importance 
of incorporating smart growth into
Scarborough’s Dunstan neighborhood.
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stages possible, rather than merely applying a negotia-
tion band-aid late in the game. 
It is this larger issue of public process that 
should be the focus here. At a first-time Sustainable
Communities Conference held in Portland as a result 
of activism by a new coalition of neighborhood asso-
ciations in that city, Richard Berman, a local real-estate
developer responsible for numerous innovative projects
(some built and some blocked in different communi-
ties), presented his model of successful local planning.
In his framework, the developer, the local officials and
the jurisdiction’s citizens all work together to collabo-
rate for the best interests of the community. He
proposes that each party has interests in a particular
development, but at their core, each party wants to do
what is best for the community (Berman 2003). In the
case of Dunstan Crossing, one could argue that the
process started out, in the spring of 2001, as a collabo-
ration of all three parties. At some point, it failed to 
be recognized in Scarborough that the citizens, a crit-
ical element of the triangle at the beginning (putting
aside issues about the developer-convened process),
began to be left behind as the contract zoning process
proceeded. With only two parties left working together,
the process was doomed to failure. 
Had the council in fall 2002 managed to stop the
contract zoning process long enough to absorb the
community’s concerns and possibly make substantive
changes to reflect these interests, it is likewise possible
the referendum could have been avoided. Yet the
types of changes the public demanded might then
have gutted the project of features critical to smart
growth. When opposition to the project grew, there
was little desire to go back to the drawing board and
dramatically change its size or scope. A significant
size reduction seemed the only way to get public
approval, yet it defied the goal of building a high-
density, mixed-use development. 
What to do? This situation, not unique, raises
questions about whether attempting projects of
Dunstan Crossing’s size is wise for the smart growth
movement in the New England context. It can be
argued that for the purposes of making smart growth
developments more common, incremental change is the
best option; and that the number of people who feel a
project is “just too big” will always block large depar-
tures from the status quo. To address this, comprehen-
sive planning processes could include an element of
public education on costs and benefits of sprawl in
hopes that eventually enough people will reach the
Duke of Wellington’s conclusion that “we have run 
out of money; now it is time to think.” Many environ-
mental and planning experts insist that if we do not
take dramatic leaps toward significantly higher density
projects (where they should occur, coupled with corre-
sponding safeguards on low density where it should
occur), including providing more state incentives for
towns to innovate, standard density residential develop-
ment will surely cost more than we are able to pay,
economically, environmentally and socially. 
The community clearly did not share a common
vision for the importance of incorporating smart
growth into Scarborough’s Dunstan neighborhood.
Creating a common vision was part of the early devel-
opment of Dunstan Crossing. The flaw here was the
lack of further steps providing a means for dialogue
with the public, to continue the process of creating this
common vision. The initial participatory design meet-
ings were not successful as “one-time” events, especially
with the limited percentage of the population who
participated, compared to the population that would be
party to the later process. Because the contract zoning
process took several years and the participatory design
meetings between developers and neighbors were not
repeated, the element of community support for the
project’s goals was lost, never expanded to a wider
public. The eventual referendum was less the cause of
the project’s failure than a manifestation of the failings
in the contract zoning process as a means of new resi-
dential design.
Put another way, the public’s inability to accept 
the rhetoric about the benefits of increased density
soon became synonymous with NIMBYism (“Not in
My Backyard” opposition). Opposition could either be
dismissed as uninformed about the facts, or as a
rational coping measure, given that no process was
readily available to the town’s staff and leadership to
rectify it. Besides the contract zoning process, closed
by its legal form to reinitiated deliberation among all
sides, the other engagement methods available were
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inadequate at this stage. Testimony at hearings, letters
to the editor, and other opinion-shaping efforts had
already moved simply to trying to convince the other
side of its deficient understanding or to defeat it, not
to resolve the issues. The dialogue necessary to craft
solutions was not possible. 
Based on earlier experiences, however, foresight
might have been possible; as Bruce Clary has argued 
in this journal (1997: 6), citizen NIMBY response
should not be “labeled” merely as “uninformed, overly
emotional and unwilling to compromise” but as an alert
about needs for a better process of public deliberation,
conducted at the best time (i.e., not too late).
Ideally, as described by influential smart growth
designer Peter Calthorpe (1993: 52), “each level 
of planning codes needs revision and updating, but 
the sequence is key to the result. First, broad-based
community support for the alternatives to sprawl must
be developed. Common understanding that there are
significant alternatives to sprawl and that they are
bound by specific principles must be understood by
everyone in the community. All segments of society
must participate in an effort to redefine the quality 
and form of growth in their region.”  
Absent broad public support for the goals of a
smart growth program, the Dunstan Crossing project
came to be perceived as a threat to the well-being 
of the community. The residents felt that their own
understanding of the facts of increased density—
traffic, school enrollment pressure, and loss of the small
town environment—was more credible than the project
proponents’ assurances. The lack of a regional program
for growth management left open the question of
whether the project would result in a long-term benefit
to the community. Certainly no regional process was
available either to substitute for local ones in allowing
dialogue leading to confidence about potential benefits
and understood costs. 
WHERE NEXT? SOME PROPOSITIONS
Maine’s Growth Management Act
As Scarborough demonstrates, there can be a wide
chasm between the comprehensive plan and what ends
up happening on the ground. For this reason, if the
Growth Management Act is to be effective, it needs 
to do more than mandate and provide limited incen-
tives for creation of a comprehensive plan. It needs
additionally to require that for a plan to be approved
by the state, concrete implementation details of the
plan first must be reflected in the town’s ordinances 
(a feature of Oregon’s original statewide planning
mandate in 1973). That achievement of such a
requirement may be politically infeasible is a separate
issue. The first goal of the Growth Management Act 
is “to encourage orderly growth and development in
appropriate areas of each community and region while
protecting the state’s rural character, making efficient
use of public services and preventing development
sprawl.” Such aims will not be possible to achieve 
until the plan-vs.-implementation gap is bridged. 
Since 2001, the state political process has included
several legislative committees that have suggested a
range of solutions. The legislature’s new standing
working group on these issues, the Community
Preservation Advisory Committee, now works on a
diversity of growth management issues between
sessions. So far, there have been no fundamental
changes proposed that would more assertively require
towns to work toward goals set forth in their state-
approved comprehensive plans. Until such changes 
are made, more difficulties such as those encountered 
in Scarborough can be expected. One could argue 
that even now, the law requires town ordinances to 
be brought into consistency with their comprehensive
plans within 24 months of plan approval; and that,
therefore, fundamental state policy change is not 
necessary. However, according to Evan Richert, 
State Planning Director from 1995-2001 (personal
communication), this requirement is not observed in
most cases; without a self-executing mechanism, such 
as loss of state funds following the 24-month period,
the gap between plan and reality will remain large. 
This is not to endorse categorically a particular state
mandate but to show that the current one has an
inherent tendency to encourage local governments to
set themselves up for unproductive planning dilemmas. 
To be effective, a better mechanism likely will need
to entail a combination of incentives and regulations. At
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Dunstan Crossing, for example, had the MDOT public
improvements incentives been more clearly solidified,
the town’s interest in complying with its state-approved
comprehensive plan might have been greater. However,
new funding from the legislature for smart growth
projects is not likely to be readily forthcoming. This
suggests the need for studies in Maine that clearly
demonstrate the financial costs of continued sprawl 
in contrast to the cost of smart growth. 
Regionalism
Even bridging the gap, though, will not be
enough. Forces driving sprawl in Scarborough, and
elsewhere, are regional in nature and larger than the
community effectively can solve through local ordi-
nance. Policy is living in denial of the reality of our
transportation networks, which have rendered town-
specific planning anachronistic and costly in certain
respects. Theoretically, for the higher density of a
Great American Neighborhood to have its optimum
value, it would have to be offset by lower density in
outlying areas. But without an effective regional plan-
ning mechanism, this would, of course, not occur, and
standard sprawl development would continue in the
remainder of Scarborough and the neighboring towns. 
The first Dunstan project package, including 
the developer-financed offset fund to preserve off-site 
lands from further growth and the MDOT-financed
improvements, was a creative attempt to manage
impacts beyond even a large single project. But
impacts span towns as well, and other tools are
needed. One proposed in Maine and responsive to 
the New England context is the Municipal Service
District (MSD) concept, which represents a new way
of achieving regional planning goals, while main-
taining local control (NE/EFC 2003). A MSD would
include between eight and 15 municipalities and have
a popularly elected council with representation from
each municipality. The council would have exclusive
authority over K-12 education, taxation and assess-
ment, and land use decisions such as where affordable
housing will be located in the district. By providing
regional solutions to regional land use problems,
MSDs would help to reduce sprawl. However, the
initial proposal for MSDs, presented to the legislature
in the summer of 2003, did not garner immediate
acceptance. Regionalizing education remains a legisla-
tive focus that includes some elements of the earlier
Municipal Service District proposal. This form of
regionalization may indeed lessen the property tax
burden, but other benefits of regionalism would be
foregone, and land use conundrums such as the one 
at Dunstan Crossing would remain. For this reason,
Municipal Service Districts and other proposals for
more efficient regional planning appear to remain
important options for the legislature to consider. 
The Role of Petition Referendum
Another important lesson emerging from the
Dunstan Crossing experience is about the impact and
use of citizen referendum as a tool supported by state
policy. As University of Maine Law School Professor
Orlando Delogu, a nationally respected land-use law
authority, has observed: 
There is a nice legal question that these devel-
opers might wind up putting to the state’s
highest court. Stated most simply, it is
whether individual projects such as this one,
once validly approved by planning officials
(even if the approval requires a contract
rezoning to embody the details of that
approval) should be subject to being over-
ridden by referendum. Notwithstanding
Maine’s long use of initiative and referendum
procedures, I am unaware of any Maine case
that has answered this precise question. 
Most other jurisdictions that have considered
this precise question have said, NO. They have
Forces driving sprawl in Scarborough,
and elsewhere, are regional in nature 
and larger than the community effectively
can solve through local ordinance.
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held that initiative and referendum procedures
are reserved to put in place (or overturn)
legislative acts, broad, generally applicable
policies and/or principles of the government.
They have held that individual project
approvals are quasi-judicial (administrative) in
character, and not subject to being overturned
via referendum by disgruntled citizens who
are not raising or seeking to overturn some
broad principle or policy, but simply want a
different outcome with respect to a particular
project… . While initiative and referendum
procedures have proven useful in raising 
(or defeating) broad policy questions
confronting a society, it has become too easy
for committed opponents of a particular
project to use these same tools (often mixed
with a little misinformation) to overturn safe,
well-designed, economically sound, and often
necessary development activities and/or
projects (2003: 22). 
Legislation was proposed to deal with this issue
during the 2003 legislative session, sponsored in 
part by a lawmaker who had previously worked with
the developers to facilitate the initial public design
meetings. This created a political dilemma for the
Scarborough town council, because it appeared aimed
directly at the town in an attempt to take away the
right of citizens to speak in opposition to the project.
Scarborough town councilors were vocal in their
support of the right to initiative, as given in the town
charter. Councilors had hoped to reach a successful
conclusion and avoid years of complaints that the
council had approved a project despite citizens’ wishes.
Further to Delogu’s point, the town considered the
contract zoning process to be both a legislative act and
a statement of policy (smart growth), and therefore an
appropriate use of the referendum process. Legislation
that aims to clarify when use of referenda is appro-
priate, according to the reasoning by Delogu (above),
has been drafted but not brought to the legislature
(NE/EFC 2003, Section 4, Provision X).
More useful to this discussion is to note that in
Scarborough, the use of a referendum to override 
the contract zone, while it may resemble the NIMBY
response Delogu describes, was first a symptom of the
need for a more effective public engagement process. 
Public Process
Finally, bridging the plan-vs.-implementation 
gap also requires better efforts to successfully engage
different interests on concrete matters of consensus.
Dunstan Crossing provides rich lessons about how (and
how not) to structure public engagement and delibera-
tion processes on complex, multi-interest issues like
smart growth projects. Specific and concrete lessons can
be drawn, such as the need for two-way communica-
tion. Clearly, the public hearing in which one party
presents, others comment, and no one is allowed direct
interaction, meets statutory requirements but fails to
encourage creative solutions or address doubts. Other
specific lessons include the need to repeat an exercise
such as the initial participatory design meetings beyond
the pre-application stage of a project. Additionally,
towns should convene such processes to avoid the criti-
cism that arises from having developers themselves
convene them. However, neither of the latter two
lessons about those design sessions in Scarborough
negates the fact that such deliberation with citizens
who showed up was a useful, if limited, step to take 
in each instance. Much more useful would be to place
these issues in the context of broader principles of
building deliberative processes for public decision prob-
lems such as smart growth. Building confidence in
these processes, Clary pointed out in this publication
(1997: 7), does not hinge on choosing “one best
method for…citizen input, but to us(ing) multiple
strategies over time.” 
…dissent needs to be confronted early
and with sustained engagement when
major change in the physical character 
of the community is contemplated.
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In fact, a well-developed body of practical princi-
ples has been developed about promoting consensus-
building in growth and environmental management 
as an antidote to the planning dilemma (Innes 1996,
Susskind and Gensberg 2002). This consensus-building
approach draws on techniques and strategies of direct
negotiation from the alternative dispute resolution
field’s experience with environment and development
issues, as well as reforms to citizen participation
approaches over time. 
The key principles are to embrace the need to
acknowledge and address differences over concrete
issues, and to create opportunities to convene well-
represented, deliberative processes among key propo-
nents and opponents. The aim is to overcome dilemmas
in conventional policy processes by allowing ideas
about how to satisfy each set of interests to be freely
explored. Other key aspects of the approach include
(but are not limited to) looking for gains for all inter-
ests through the open exploration process; using
neutrals to help design and conduct the process and to
promote a focus on interest-satisfaction; and creating
ways to carry out and monitor agreed actions that build
confidence. These principles are well understood in the
public policy ADR field. The steps involved in either
consensus-building or effective negotiation can be
summarized as: convening, clarifying responsibilities,
framing the issues, deliberating, deciding to maximize
the interests satisfied, and implementing. 
This approach explicitly depends on the idea that
such processes should be consciously designed. Some
tailoring may be needed in each situation. Neither
effective participation nor consensus-seeking efforts 
can occur from merely stringing together activities and
interactions that are not carefully tied to key decision-
making steps and to each other. In the Dunstan case,
the initial design sessions with citizens could have
benefited from direct recruitment of key neighborhood
and opinion leaders and others who might have been
expected to have a stake in a consequential change.
Such identification, as well as recruitment, is routinely
done in consensus-building processes by neutrals, for
example. The town could have beneficially acted as the
convener, in fact, although this requires careful effort 
to avoid conflicting with any due process requirements.
More to the point, the town could have reconvened
such interactive design deliberations at a slightly later
but still midterm point. While such a need may not
have been practically apparent at the beginning of the
Dunstan Crossing process, it is in the nature of a lesson
to require that the rigors of learning be used to antici-
pate new situations later if it is to have any value at 
all. Ultimately, town staff, rather than elected officials,
must be charged with keeping track of emerging issues
needing a more involved public process.
Indeed, a broad lesson here is that dissent needs 
to be confronted early and with sustained engagement
when major change in the physical character of the
community is contemplated. Because no one knows 
the long-term consequences of change, this requires
more than conflict resolution, though it entails similar
processes. In particular, it requires a search for a consen-
sual vision for change. Conventional long-range plan-
ning processes often fail to meet this need because they
focus on the lowest common denominator of consent,
exporting genuine resolution of issues to the future. 
Yet another lesson from Dunstan for the effective
implementation of smart growth initiatives lies in the
question of “Who is driving? Private or public inter-
ests?” In this case, the public clearly believed that
private interest—the developer—was driving this major
policy decision, and therefore it was suspect. Concerns
over how much the developer would profit from the
project at the public’s expense clouded discussion of
the public benefits of denser development. Had the
zoning provisions been made independent of and 
prior to a particular proposal—the sequence Calthorpe
(1993) points out is desirable—the discussion over
density could have been blind to the profit motive and
focused instead on environmental impact.
Finally, for effective leadership in a controversial
political environment, the public must have opportuni-
ties to interact with their government before decisions
are made. Once the contract zoning document was 
on the table, the public was unable to sway the
Scarborough town council from implementing it. 
While most councilors still believe the project was in the
best interests of the town, it is debatable whether the
town council can retain public trust and defy the vocal-
ized concerns of a portion of its citizens at the same
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time. In the end, lack of ability to
halt the process for successful two-
way dialogue may have been the
project’s primary undoing. Public
hearings are thus an insufficient
method of citizen-government
interaction. New statutory guide-
lines for public participation must
be designed that allow legitimate
use of these time-outs for direct
engagement that are the heart of
the consensus-building approach.
Further, such processes must be
repeated in a community more
than once, else the social capital
necessary to grapple with the
future in a healthy manner is not
likely to develop.
CONCLUSION
The Dunstan Crossing experi-ence reminds us that 20 years
of emphasis on comprehensive
planning by the state have failed
to get alternatives to sprawl to be
implemented in growth areas of
the state. This raises serious ques-
tions about the nature of our
representative democracy and how we respond to
public input concerning development patterns. What
kinds of public involvement processes most effectively
capture citizens’ visions for how Maine should be
developed? Is anybody in Maine paying attention to
what works and what does not in this regard? These
questions lead to bigger ones: Who are we as a
community and how do we communicate with our
government? What do we want Maine to look like in
20 years? What kind of transportation networks are we
going to have around our service centers? Dunstan
Crossing doesn’t have answers to these questions, but it
begs us to ask them.
If we look at Maine as a whole, we can basically
divide it into three regions: the majority geographic
area of the state, where few people live; the service
centers, where many people both live and work; and
the rural areas adjacent to service centers, where many
live, but fewer work. Right now the biggest trend is
for people to live in rural areas and commute longer
and longer distances into service areas. Unless we want
this trend to continue until sprawl development and all
its associated costs have spoiled what makes Maine
special, now is the time to ask and answer the tough
questions about how best to respond to pressures of
growth. If there is any hope that developers like the
ones who so boldly extended themselves with
Dunstan Crossing might be willing to come forward
with similar proposals, Maine communities owe it to
themselves and their citizens to convene processes that
will allow effective and fruitful deliberation over these
challenging and important choices.  
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ENDNOTE
1. A description of the Great American Neighborhood
may be found on the Maine State Plasnning Office’s
Web site, http://www.state.me.us/spo/landuse/pubs/
gandesc.php.
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